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Abstract
Is the common cause principle merely one of a set of useful heuristics for dis-
covering causal relations, or is it rather a piece of heavy duty metaphysics,
capable of grounding the direction of causation itself? Since the princi-
ple was introduced in Reichenbach’s groundbreaking work The Direction
of Time (1956), there have been a series of attempts to pursue the latter
program—to take the probabilistic relationships constitutive of the princi-
ple of the common cause and use them to ground the direction of causation.
These attempts have not all explicitly appealed to the principle as originally
formulated; it has also appeared in the guise of independence conditions,
counterfactual overdetermination, and, in the causal modelling literature, as
the causal markov condition. In this paper, I identify a set of difficulties
for grounding the asymmetry of causation on the principle and its descen-
dents. The first difficulty, concerning what I call the vertical placement of
causation, consists of a tension between considerations that drive towards
the macroscopic scale, and considerations that drive towards the microscopic
scale—the worry is that these considerations cannot both be comfortably ac-
commodated. The second difficulty consists of a novel potential counterex-
ample to the principle based on the familiar Einstein Podolsky Rosen (EPR)
cases in quantum mechanics.
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I. INTRODUCTION: WHY DO METAPHYSICS?
In The Direction of Time (1956), Hans Reichenbach developed a theory of cau-
sation that included two elements—now unremarkable—that at the time marked
significant departures from philosophical orthodoxy. Firstly, he held causation to
be probabilistic1. Secondly, he attempted to give an explanation of causal asym-
metry in terms independent of temporal order. Central in his account of causal
asymmetry was what he termed the principle of the common cause—informally, if
”an improbable coincidence has occurred, there must exist a common cause” (p.
157). The temporal orientation of causation is explained by the contingent fact that
common causes tend to lie in (what we call) the past rather than (what we call) the
future of the coincident events in question.
For Reichenbach the principle of the common cause was neither autonomous
nor fundamental, being derived from the second law of thermodynamics and his
hypothesis of the branch structure of thermodynamic systems. However in the
subsequent literature the principle—or at least the key insight it embodies—has
become increasingly detached from this context and developed into independent
reductive grounds for the direction of causation. In addition to direct heirs of Re-
ichenbach such as Dowe (2000), the common cause principle has appeared in the
guise of independence conditions (Ehring, 1982; Papineau, 1985a,b, 1993; Haus-
man, 1998), counterfactual overdetermination (Lewis, 1979, 1986c), and, in the
causal modelling literature, as the causal markov condition (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes
et al., 2000). Of course, those developing the causal modelling framework do not
take themselves to be providing an account of the asymmetry of causation. For a
start, they do not standardly take themselves to be pursuing reductive projects in
the first place. Moreover, if you ask a causal modeller about the place of the direc-
tion of causation in their work, they will tell you that temporal orientation is simply
assumed2. But—science for the scientists, philosophy for the philosophers—there
have been a number of philosophers who take it that the causal modelling frame-
work provides reductive grounds for the direction of causation after all (see Pap-
ineau, 1993; Field, 2003).
Why should we not dismiss these latter views on the grounds that they are
unfaithful to the very theories on which they wish to hang their metaphysics? Since
1While Good (1961a,b) is a much ignored early proponent of probabilistic causation, my own
ignorance is for present purposes justified, as he assumes the temporal orientation of causation from
the outset. Suppes (1970), a much more widely known treatment, does likewise.
2There are at least two reasons why this is the case. Firstly, the various causal discovery algo-
rithms on offer typically deliver a set of compatible causal models (a so-called markov equivalence
class) rather than a unique causal model for any set of probabilistic data—and so additional infor-
mation is required to select the correct model. Secondly, for any reasonably complex system the
algorithmic search space will be extremely large—and so again, any available information which
could reduce the search space will normally be employed. Temporal order is an obvious candidate in
both cases. On the face of it, the latter poses less of a problem for the metaphysical reductionist, since
the role of temporal information can here be reasonably construed as pragmatic or heuristic. Such a
strategy sits less easily with the former, however; this will be discussed further in what follows.
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our best frameworks for causal modelling simply assume a direction of causation,
shouldn’t we expect that thinking about the temporal asymmetry of causation in
light of these frameworks will be at best unfruitful, at worst circular? I think this
is too hasty. Indeed, I think that attention to the issues here is of both independent
and practical interest, for at least two reasons.
Firstly, getting clear about the situations under which one would be prepared
to accept the existence of backwards causation provides a means by which the
concept (or concepts) of causation, so interwoven with other temporal and modal
concepts, can be isolated and clarified. The questions here are those such as, which
temporal facts can be varied without varying causal facts? Likewise, which modal
facts can be varied without varying causal facts? Much recent debate in the philo-
sophical literature on causation revolves around precisely these sorts of questions.
Secondly, and most importantly for the purposes of this paper, is the converse of
the preceding point. This is that taking the various methods of discovering causal
relations on offer, and imagining the features which they detect to exist in the re-
verse temporal direction, allows the exploration of whether these features can be
said to be constitutive of the causal relation or just defeasible heuristics for the
causal relation. In the remainder of the paper I examine this latter question with
respect to the principle of the common cause.
Before I proceed, however, some deflationary remarks are in order for those
who suspect that the method I have just sketched sounds a little too much like
conceptual analysis. It has become increasingly frequent in the literature on cau-
sation to claim that what is being attempted is not conceptual analysis but rather
the a posteriori identification of what causation is, in the physical world. Such an
approach is explicitly endorsed by Menzies (1996), Kistler (1999), Dowe (2000),
Steel (2004), and, in order to defend his theory against a series of objections for-
mulated in the way I have just described, by Papineau (1988). The idea here is
to deny the link between conceivability and possibility; here is Papineau (1988, p.
524):
I don’t claim that such cases [conceivable counterexamples] are con-
ceptually impossible. My claim is simply that my theory identifies the
real nature of the cause-effect relationship.
As a general point, this is undoubtedly true—I can imagine myself flying, and yet
I cannot fly. The general point here is also, I take it, applicable to various of the
more metaphysically speculative thought experiments in the literature (the locus
classicus here is Tooley, 1990)3. Nevertheless, the reply is only available for those
counterexamples which rely on grounds weaker than the theory being criticised. In
general, we should not expect this to be clear-cut; and in particular cases, we can be
confident that the burden of proof is on the proposed theory. That is, we can, with
the a posteriori reductionist, deny the link between conceivability and possibility,
3For example, why should we concede that the conceivability of simple worlds with uninstanti-
ated causal laws as brute simples entails that in our world, causal laws can not be reduced?
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and yet still do thought experiments to assess proposed reductions—if we have
good independent reasons for thinking the situations we have described nomolog-
ically possible. Nobody objected to the Einstein et al. (1935) thought experiment
concerning the completeness of quantum mechanics; and rightly so, since there
were excellent theoretical grounds for believing it to be possible. Likewise, in this
paper I will not be offering anything controversial by way of thought experiment—
indeed, I will just be describing what goes on in certain cases of actual scientific
and everyday practice. And so this loophole will not be available for those theories
I take as my targets.
II. THE COMMON CAUSE PRINCIPLE
At first glance, the informal expression of the principle of the common cause given
by Reichenbach above (“if an improbable coincidence has occurred, there must
exist a common cause”) cannot be what is intended. Reichenbach is surely not
committing himself to the impossibility of one-off, purely chancy coincidences.
Rather, it is repeated incidences of some prima facie coincidence that call for
explanation—the improbable correlation of two (or more) events over time. This is
made clear in the formal probabilistic definition of the principle given by Reichen-
bach (1956, pp. 157-167). He writes (p. 163):
If coincidences of two events A and B occur more frequently than
would correspond to their independent occurrence, that is, if the events
satisfy relation (1), then there exists a common cause C for these
events such that the fork ACB is conjunctive, that is, satisfies relations
(5)-(8).
The relations being:
(1) P(A&B)> P(A)×P(B)
(5) P(A&B|C) = P(A|C)×P(B|C)
(6) P(A&B|¬C) = P(A|¬C)×P(B|¬C)
(7) P(A|C)> P(A|¬C)
(8) P(B|C)> P(B|¬C)
That is, conditionalising on the common cause, and on the absence of the com-
mon cause, renders the effects independent (this is often referred to as the common
cause screening off the effects); and the common cause raises the probability of
both effects individually. In the language of independence, effects of a common
cause are correlated, but causes of a common effect are not. In the language of
overdetermination, there are many distinct effects which individually determine
the occurrence of some cause, but there is only one cause that individually deter-
mines any effect. Obviously, these are rough and ready formulations of the related
principles, and there are significant differences in the way they have been devel-
oped into complete theories of causal asymmetry. It is not the place of this paper to
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explore these differences in any detail4. Rather, in what follows I will restrict dis-
cussion to the principle as given above, and indicate where the discussion carries
over to the neighbouring theories.
The principle as stated is not yet sufficient for an analysis of causal asymmetry.
To see this, consider any device which records correlated events. To modify an
example from Reichenbach (p. 158), suppose two nearby geysers (A and B) spout
irregularly, but (nearly always5) in unison—and suppose some geyser-enthusiast
sits nearby, recording every dual spout with a tick in her notebook (D) (see Fig-
ure 1). The probabilities of each geyser spouting and the ticks being recorded in the
notebook satisfy (1) and (5)–(8) (p. 162), and yet the tick, which is the screening
off event, occurs later than the correlated geysers, which are the events screened off
(A and B). The events are said, in the jargon, to constitute a conjunctive fork open
to the past. Reichenbach is thus led to expand on the principle, by claiming that
conjunctive forks open to the past are always matched by conjunctive forks open
to the future, while conjunctive forks open to the future are not likewise matched.
Here, for example, the event establishing the fork open to the future would be
the increased water pressure in the reservoir responsible for the geyser spouts (C).
Reichenbach refers to cases where correlated events are screened off on both tem-
poral ends as double forks (p. 159); they are also sometimes called closed forks.
The common cause principle thus becomes: all open forks are open to the future.
Note that in order for the arrows to be drawn onto closed forks, there must be
a predominance of forks open to one direction rather than another; otherwise the
temporally reversed interpretation would be equally justified. So, in Figure 1, it
is the (hypothetical) predominance of forks open to the right side of the diagram
that allows us both to say that the direction of causation runs left to right, and
(therefore) that the arrows have been drawn correctly onto the closed fork6. Note
also that if the common cause principle is constitutive of the direction of causation,
we should be licensed by the existence of forks open in the opposite direction to
infer the existence of backwards causation.
As Reichenbach notes, this is an “indirect” solution (p. 162), since it makes
causal asymmetry a function of factors extrinsic to the events in question—and
this is one place where the cluster of theories referred to above diverge. Hausman,
Lewis and Ehring seek to keep the asymmetry intrinsic, while Dowe, Papineau and
Field—after Reichenbach—opt for an extrinsic solution. Each have their problems,
and I will return to the issues this introduces in Section III. For the moment, note
that the correlation given by (1) is crucial here. Any device which records coin-
4Unfortunately, I know of no comprehensive survey of the differences and similarities between
the theories, though Hausman (1998) provides some detailed criticism of each of the others.
5When I presented this paper at Konstanz without this qualification, Chris Hitchcock and Iain
Martel were quick to point out that Reichenbach explicitly disallowed probabilities of unity, since
this prevents the disambiguation of causal asymmetry by the principle of the common cause. The
remainder of the paper should be read with this qualification implicit—it does not alter the structure
of the argument.
6In fact, Reichenbach appealed to networks of probabilistically related events rather than global
predominance. I will return to this point in what follows.
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Figure 1: Open and closed forks.
cidences of events—our geyser-enthusiast recording, in another column, the times
when the moon is full and the geysers spout, say—will satisfy the screening off
relations (5)–(8)7. But this doesn’t count as a conjunctive fork in Reichenbach’s
sense, since presumably the frequency of geyser spouts during a full moon is just
what we would expect given the individual frequencies of geyser spouts and full
moons generally. The fact that it is only probabilistically correlated events that
stand in need of causal explanation will become important in what follows.
The existence of closed forks provides one example of a set of events that
satisfy the probabilistic formulation of the principle of the common cause, and yet
cannot form the basis for causal asymmetry—namely, the set of events in a closed
fork comprising the correlated events, and the future screening off event. In this
case the appeal to a past screening off event allows the principle to survive without
appeal to temporally asymmetric facts. However there are other cases where the
probabilistic relationships obtain and yet we do not have a conjunctive fork. One
example is given by Salmon (1980, p. 217) and Arntzenius (1999, n. 2). Consider
a case where an event C is the common cause of events A1 and B1, and where A1
causes A2 and B1 causes B2. In this case A2 and B2 will be screened off by both A1
and B1, and yet by stipulation neither is a common cause of their correlation (see
Figure 2).
Likewise for causal chains (Papineau, 1993). The probabilistic relations de-
fined above hold between any three items in a causal chain; when A causes C
which causes B, or when B causes C which causes A, C screens off A and B (see
7Of course (5) and (6) follow trivially, since there was no correlation in need of screening off—
the point here is that any instance of record keeping establishes the probabilistic relations (7) and
(8).
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Figure 3: Screening off in causal chains.
Figure 3). Indeed, Papineau (1989, p. 337) takes screening off of this sort to be in
part definitive of the notion of a causal chain.
This is where the assumption of temporal orientation is standardly introduced.
The assumption of temporal orientation can discriminate between the open con-
junctive fork in Figure 1 and the causal chains in Figure 3, if we know the temporal
order of the events in question, on the assumption that causes precede their effects
in time. That is, if we take time to run from left to right, and assume that the con-
junctive fork open to the future in Figure 1 correctly represents the temporal order
of the events, then both chains in Figure 3 can be ruled out on the grounds that they
represent a later event (A and B respectively) causing an earlier event (C). Like-
wise, if we assume that either chain in Figure 3 correctly represents the temporal
order of the events, then Figure 1 can be ruled out on the grounds that it represents
a later event (C) causing an earlier event (A and B respectively).
But of course we cannot use this method if it is the direction of causation itself
that we are trying to ground probabilistically. There remains a weaker, symmetric
temporal principle, which Reichenbach is sometimes held to have invoked, where
simultaneous correlated events are ruled out as candidates for direct causal con-
nections with each other (see for example Berkovitz, 2002, pp. 242ff ; Hausman,
1998, p. 210 n. 2, also takes Papineau, 1989, p. 336, to be flirting with this idea).
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The idea here is to appeal to special relativity, which forbids any direct causal con-
nection between simultaneous events8—so if A and B are simultaneous then we
can rule out both chains in Figure 3 on grounds that have invoked temporal order
but not temporal orientation. This principle is far too weak to cover all the cases,
however—often one or more of the effects of a common cause will occur earlier
or later than the others, and intuitively the principle ought to apply to these as
well. Indeed, the only earth-bound correlated events which would fall inside this
constraint would be those occurring within the order of nanoseconds of each other
(Salmon, 1980, pp. 217-218).
For those seeking a reduction of causation to probabilities, there is another
solution available, and it invokes essentially the same strategy used for ordering
closed forks as described above. The idea is to find some further event whose
probabilistic relationship with the events in question enables the asymmetry to be
determined. Take, again, Figure 1 and Figure 3, and suppose there is some further
event (E) which satisfies the following probabilistic relationships (following Pap-
ineau, 1993, p. 240): correlated with C and B; not correlated with A; correlation
with B screened off by C; correlation with C not screened off by anything. If we
assume that correlation is essential for causation, we can identify the correct di-
agram as the first chain in Figure 3—if Figure 1 or the second chain in Figure 3
were correct we should see E correlated with A (see Figure 4).
This general strategy also traces to Reichenbach, and has recently been de-
fended by Dowe (2000). And as suggested in Section I, while Spirtes et al. (2000)
do not see themselves as involved in such a project, both Papineau (1993) and Field
(2003) have taken their causal modelling framework to provide a means of draw-
ing the causal arrows onto networks of probabilistic dependence in this way. In the
following section, I examine the prospects for this strategy.
III. WHERE IN THE WORLD IS CAUSATION?
In order to establish the causal order for any particular set of events, for whom the
probabilistic relationships underdetermine the appropriate causal model, an appeal
is made to the surrounding causal network. Thus, the asymmetry of any particular
causal relation is extrinsically determined. This is not without particular advan-
tages. For a start, those who wish to rest the asymmetry on something like the
common cause principle, and yet keep causal asymmetry intrinsic, are faced with
immediate problems concerning instances of causation which do not appear to form
the right sort of forks. While the common cause principle is plausible as a more
or less intrinsic feature of situations with macroscopically correlated effects, such
as stones dropping into ponds, the sort of forks needed for situations without such
macroscopic effects do not seem capable of playing the role required of them. For
8I leave to one side here issues concerning the possibility of simultaneous causation—even if
simultaneous causation is possible in some circumstances, it certainly isn’t going to apply to all
cases which fall under the principle of the common cause.
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Figure 4: Fixing temporal orientation with further probabilities.
instance, take an inexpert billiard player shooting a cue ball into an eight ball on
an otherwise empty table, and consider the causal relationship between the colli-
sion, and the eight ball hitting the cushion of the table. For Lewis (1979, 1986c),
whose overdetermination is designed to provide the intrinsic asymmetry in every
particular case of causation, it must be the case that the effects of the collision
overdetermine the collision, while the causes do not. But where is this to be found
in the region of the collision and its consequences? It cannot be in the macroscopic
variables such as momentum, coarsely specified, and so Lewis ends up appealing
to facts that in this case amount to the dissipative friction of the billiard balls on
the table, and the light reflected from their surface (Lewis, 1979, pp. 469-470).
These temporal asymmetries in the collision seem slender grounds for the causal
asymmetry, however. If the collision occurs in the dark, at zero gravity, at zero
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temperature, in a soundless vacuum, are we led to doubt the asymmetry of the
case? Rather, it seems plausible to appeal to surrounding macroscopic events—the
person hitting the ball, for example—and to trace out a network that will eventually
exhibit the desired asymmetry.
It might be objected here that the move to the surrounding probabilistic net-
work makes the asymmetry of causation unacceptably extrinsic9. But since it is
already the existence of the second prong of a fork which gives the asymmetry to
the first, and since it was a further extrinsic move which saved closed forks from
being counterexamples to the principle of the common cause, this in itself will not
be of concern to proponents of the approach. Moreover, if we adopt something like
a frequentist view of probability, the theory is extrinsic right there in the probabilis-
tic foundations (as it were). (On the other hand, if our theory of the causal relation
is not itself a probabilistic one, we might have problems justifying why probabil-
ities should matter for the asymmetry. This point is made by Dowe (1992b) with
respect to the causal process theory of Salmon—the problem is why it should be
that a causal process, which is an intrinsic property of a physical system, should
be given its direction by extrinsic, de facto relations with surrounding causal pro-
cesses. This point carries over to other theories which attempt to use the common
cause principle as a plug-in solution for causal asymmetry, but needn’t concern us
here). Finally, as Papineau (1989, p. 336) suggests, we are already familiar with
the extrinsic explanation of asymmetries, since the thermodynamic and radiative
temporal asymmetries are plausibly explained by extrinsic boundary conditions10.
A more specific concern about the appeal to extrinsic facts in fixing the direc-
tion of causation is that it may threaten the possibility of backwards causation—and
since the theories under consideration are motivated in large part by the desire to
9Tooley(1987, p. 237; 1993, p. 22) has pressed the objection that to rely on causal nets makes
causation unacceptably extrinsic. Appeal to intuitions concerning the intrinsic nature of causation
has also been made by, for example, McDermott (1999, p. 303) and Lewis (1986b, pp. 205-207).
A somewhat related concern is raised by Price (1993). Price points out that in order for temporal
asymmetry not to be smuggled into the account (what he calls disguised conventionalism), the prob-
abilities used must be temporally symmetric. But, he claims, if we use a naı¨ve actual frequentist
interpretation of probability, we become committed to only talking about causation where we have
enough correlation to speak of statistical dependence—committed, that is, to the impossibility of
single-case causation. It seems to me that this is a worry about probabilistic or regularity theories of
causation in general rather than about their prospects for explaining causal asymmetry, however—
Hume’s account of constant conjunction is open to the same sort of objection, after all. The way
out is, obviously, modal, and Price further charges that whatever modal notions are appealed to here
will be as difficult to provide a temporal asymmetry for as the causal asymmetry we are seeking
to ground. But this has no purchase on the theories under consideration, since the probabilities in-
volved are all atemporal— if they were not, we would have been cut short at the very first step in the
proposed reduction.
10While this is correct, the analogy shouldn’t be pressed too hard. While we have a clear idea of
what it would take for thermodynamic and radiative asymmetries to be reversed, it is less clear what
criteria we should use to adjudicate cases of backwards causation. So for the former asymmetries, we
have clearly defined asymmetric phenomena which stand in need of explanation; while in the latter
case I take it that we are still attempting to explain the sense in which the phenomena is asymmetric
in the first place.
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make the existence of backwards causation an a posteriori matter, this ought to be
particularly worrying. For example, there have been some suggestions for fixing
causal asymmetry by indexing it to the temporal asymmetry of the neutral kaon,
or the global entropy gradient provided by the second law of thermodynamics11.
Given that these strategies fix the direction of causation globally, however, there
can be no room for local instances of backwards causation—indeed, given this fact,
it is hard to see how these strategies are an improvement over simply identifying
causal order with temporal order. But the appeal to the probabilistic network does
not have this particular problem. As we have seen, the probabilistic relationships
definitive of open forks are defined atemporally, and so it remains a possibility that
there exist situations with forks open to the past, even in the context of a network
where the majority of forks are open to the future. So rather than ruling out the pos-
sibility of backwards causation, the theories under consideration provide the means
of identifying when we have it—namely, anywhere there is a fork open to the past.
Unfortunately, as I will argue in Section IV, this consequence of the approach is
open to counterexample.
Before setting out the counterexample, however, there is a further issue for the
causal modelling approach, related to extrinsic concerns, which bears examination.
We can think of the issues discussed so far in this section as concerning where
to place causal asymmetry. Is it an intrinsic property of causal relations, or is it
determined extrinsically? So far, we have been concerned with how widely we
need to cast the net. It turns out, unsurprisingly, that in order to carry out the
reduction, we need nothing less than every relevant variable in the whole universe
(Papineau, 1993)—or at least all those in the causal network in which we find
ourselves. This follows, trivially, from the fact that what we consider a direct causal
relation might in fact be one governed by a common cause of which we haven’t
taken account; and the fact that, as we have seen, the selection of the correct model
from a series of candidates is achieved by appeal to further variables. The appeal to
ever-wider networks has been a point of criticism (see for example Hausman, 1998,
pp. 219-221), but it seems to me that the criticism relies on metaphysical intuitions
of precisely the sort Papineau wishes to resist (see Section I). There are, however,
issues not just regarding the horizontal placement of the asymmetry of causation,
but also regarding what we can think of as the vertical placement of causation—
concerning where the explanation of causal asymmetry lies on the scale from the
microscopic to the macroscopic.
The worry here is raised by Price (1992), who notes that the fork asymmetry is
absent at the microscopic level, given the time-symmetric determination of funda-
mental physics. It is for this reason that Field (2003) emphasises what he calls the
salience condition:
The salience condition needs emphasis: if the universe is two-way
deterministic as in classical physics, one can find very unnatural vari-
11Dowe (1992a) suggests both strategies in the context of process theories, while Collins et al.
(2004) suggest the entropic strategy for fixing counterfactual dependence.
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ables for which the temporal orientation [in causal graphs] is reversed
[...] And with “exact” variables in the sense explained above [that is,
variables specifying a complete physical description], the asymmetry
completely disappears in classical physics.
Both Papineau (1993) and Field (2003)—exemplary in their commitment to a pos-
teriori reduction—just bite the bullet here, and claim as an empirical discovery the
fact that causation is much less widespread than we had thought, holding only at the
level of those variables we find salient. I think a strategy endorsed by Dowe (1992a)
is perhaps preferable here, where we instead have the microscopic asymmetry de-
termined by the macroscopic asymmetry which it composes, or with which it is
probabilistically connected. But in either case, the absence of the fork asymmetry
at the microscopic level is kept at bay by taking causation to be a relation that only
holds amongst the sort of macroscopic variables that we ordinarily take an interest
in12. At this point we may begin to wonder how objective an reduction this is turn-
ing out to be, appealing as it does to the anthropocentric notion of salience. And
there is a more serious problem lurking around the corner.
In order to introduce the problem, it bears mentioning the form in which the
common cause principle has made it into the methods used in causal modelling.
Spirtes et al. (2000), Pearl (2000) and Woodward (2003) adopt a restricted version
of the common cause principle as an axiom in the procedure for inferring causal
relations from statistical data, in the form of the causal markov condition. As
Hausman and Woodward (1999, p. 524) observe, this can be usefully considered
as the conjunction of two claims:
(1) If X and Y are probabilistically dependent, then either X causes Y
or Y causes X or X and Y are effects of some common cause Z.
(2) Conditional on its direct causes, X is probabilistically independent
of everything except its effects.
The causal markov condition is superior to the original formulation of the principle
of the common cause in many respects, though we can safely set these aside for
present purposes13. Here we can note firstly that the use of causal concepts in the
characterisation makes it clear that it is not intended to be reductive, and secondly
that it does nevertheless retain the claim that there is no probabilistic dependence
without causal dependence (1), and that the effects of common causes are screened
off by those common causes (2). A counterexample to (2) has been proposed by
Salmon; my counterexample will be to (1).
Salmon (1980, p. 223) describes a case where our inexpert billiard player, in
the same situation as described earlier, has only a half chance of sinking the eight
ball. But suppose the case is such that for all the ways in which the eight ball might
be sunk, the cue ball will certainly sink as well. Call the shooting of the cue ball C,
12This consequence of the approach ought to appear striking to those philosophers used to formu-
lating causal exclusion arguments premised on causation being the province of fundamental physics.
13See Hausman and Woodward (1999) for the details.
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the cue ball sinking A, and the eight ball sinking B. Here we have P(B|A)> P(B),
and therefore a correlation which stands in need of causal explanation. But the only
prima facie candidate for a common cause—the shooting of the cue ball—doesn’t
screen off the correlation, since P(B|C) = 12 while P(B|A&C) = 1. Somewhat
remarkably, given the line of argument for salience given above, the stock reply
here, given by both Spirtes et al. (2000, p. 63) and by Hausman and Woodward
(1999, pp. 528-529), is to appeal to a more complete specification of the physical
system in question. Indeed, Hausman and Woodward explicitly disavow salience:
The claim that is defended in the response is that [...] there must exist
some set of screening-off common causes. [...] this is very different
from saying that even the full set of variables that people ordinarily
describe as common causes will screen off their joint effects or that
it will be possible to specify a set of screening-off common causes in
terms of any particular framework or vocabulary for dividing up the
world [...].
It may be reason enough to suspect the general validity of the causal markov condi-
tion, that it doesn’t hold among the variables we find salient (indeed, it was enough
for Salmon to reject it). At the very least, it necessitates some substantial theoret-
ical maneuvering on the epistemological side of the theory—in this example, how
do we know that the cue ball sinking isn’t a direct cause of the eight ball sinking,
or vice versa, given that we don’t have access to the precise physical details of the
case? But the real problem here is that, as we have already seen, reasoning from
the bottom up tells us that the causal markov condition will in fact cease to hold
as we move to more fundamental, less inherently statistical levels of description.
There is pressure here, then, from both above and below—the reformulation of the
causal markov condition as a commitment to the existence of some set of variables
for which it holds has all the flavour of a promissory note that cannot be cashed.
To reiterate the point here, we can look at Hausman and Woodward replying
to another counterexample, given by Arntzenius (1993). Arntzenius observes that
in a gas moving to thermodynamic equilibrium, there will be correlations between
the temperature and pressure in different regions of the gas without there being a
common cause. Again, Hausman and Woodward (1999, p. 530) revert to the “com-
plicated causal story [...] involving huge numbers of molecules [...] that, because
it is deterministic, must conform to the Markov Condition”—assuming determin-
ism, they say, the “full set of determining causes” is such as to function as the
required common cause. But notice that once we have zoomed down to this level,
the full set of microscopic variables at any timeslice will suffice to perform this
function—if we ignore temporal ordering, the probabilistic information radically
underdetermines the choice of causal model, even if (in fact, precisely because) we
can assume what Hausman and Woodward term causal sufficiency (the assumption
that we have taken account of all the relevant variables)14. Given determinism,
14Hausman himself makes essentially this point when he points out that in the deterministic case,
14
that is, any time slice of the system will, on some model, fulfill the causal markov
condition for any other time slice of the system (see Arntzenius, 1993, 1999). So
what we have here is really, rather than the failure of the causal markov condition
to apply to the case, a situation where the causal markov condition fails to pick
out one causal model among many—and in a set where the direction of the causal
relation can vary freely with respect to the direction of time.
IV. YET ONE MORE EPR COUNTEREXAMPLE
In the preceding section the focus was on the screening off property of common
causes, captured by claim (2) of the Hausman and Woodward definition of the
causal markov condition. In this section I give a potential counterexample to claim
(1) of the condition, which was:
(1) If X and Y are probabilistically dependent, then either X causes Y
or Y causes X or X and Y are effects of some common cause Z.
It is well known that quantum mechanics raises a number of difficulties for this
claim, and in what follows I focus on the famous EPR cases (Einstein et al., 1935),
and in particular the constraints on their interpretation provided by Bell’s Theorem
(Bell, 1964)15. I will not rehearse the experimental arrangements or the theorem
itself here, as both have received extensive treatment elsewhere. Rather, I will
describe a consequence of the theorem for the principle of the common cause that
to my knowledge has not yet been noticed.
Recall the geyser-enthusiast from Section II, who by recording correlated geyser
spouts created future screening-off events; and recall Reichenbach’s claim that
this is not a case of backwards causation so long as there exists a corresponding
screening-off event in the past. Now, suppose that our geyser-enthusiast becomes
an EPR enthusiast, recording in her notebook the measurement outcomes from a
series of EPR experiments. Here we have a set of future screening off events, as in
the geyser case. But in the EPR case, Bell’s Theorem rules out the existence of any
past screening off event (so-called hidden variables) with which to close the fork,
and so we have a prima facie case of forks open to the past. If such cases (for EPR
correlations are recorded all the time) in fact provide forks open to the past, then
we have a set of clear counterexamples to the principle of the common cause.
Note that this result is stronger than is usually claimed by those who see the
EPR cases as refuting the principle. Normally the claim is simply that we have in
these cases a set of correlations which are not (perhaps cannot) be screened off—
and therefore a counterexample to the universality of the principle. If this were
the only problem, however, it could be easily evaded by making the formulation
“the probability of y conditional on the direct causes of x will be the same as the probability of y
conditional on x and all the direct causes of x” (1998, p. 215)
15I use the phrase for the time being to refer not only to the specific theorem first given by Bell,
but to the family of theorems inspired by Bell that purport to prevent any local-realistic interpretation
of quantum mechanics. Later in the paper I will focus on one particular theorem.
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conditional: if there is a screening-off event, then the direction of causation is given
by the principle of the common cause. After all, the principle of the common cause
is a principle governing causation, and—pace Reichenbach—it need be no part of
such a theory that all correlations permit causal explanation. This is the attitude
taken, for example, by Papineau (1989), who—referring to the EPR correlations
as “unscreenable-off” (p. 336)—writes: “I don’t claim that all correlations are
causal, just that if there is a screener-off it is the cause” (ibid). The EPR enthusiast
shows that this is false, by providing an example of forks open to the past which
are clearly not instances of backwards causation—if they were, we would be able
to manipulate past measurement results by writing in notebooks.
At this point it may seem as if something must have gone wrong—if Bell’s
Theorem shows that there cannot be a common cause of the EPR measurement
results, why does it not apply equally well to the records taken by the EPR enthu-
siast?16 And yet surely the case we have imagined is possible; for one, the EPR
correlations are perfectly analogous to the Geyser correlations from the perspective
of the EPR enthusiast; and of course, EPR measurement results are recorded with
unremarkable frequency by experimental physicists the world over. This apparent
tension is resolved by considering more carefully what Bell’s Theorem rules out,
and what the EPR enthusiast must write down in her notebook in order for her
records to screen off the measurement results. Since there is a family of theorems
which fall under the Bell moniker, and what is ruled out differs from theorem to
theorem, I focus here for definiteness on the version due independently to Wigner
(1970) and Belinfante (1973).
As catalogued by van Fraassen (1982, p. 31), the premises of the Bell-Wigner
argument are causality, locality and autonomy. Causality is simply the common
cause requirement: that the hidden variables function as a common cause of the
measurement results, so that the joint probabilities of measurement results for the
two particles are just the product of the probabilities of the individual measurement
results, conditional on the hidden variables. Locality and autonomy are restrictions
on how the requirement of causality may be satisfied, and so strictly are premises
that go beyond the principle of the common cause17. Locality dictates that the mea-
surement result for a particular particle depends only on the hidden variables and
the apparatus measuring that particular particle, or to put it conversely, measure-
ment results for a particular particle are independent of measurements performed
on the other particle. Autonomy is the requirement that the hidden variables are sta-
tistically independent of the type of measurements performed on either particle—
that is, hidden variables do not influence the selection of which measurements to
perform, and measurements do not influence the values of hidden variables. To-
16I owe this observation to Huw Price.
17This bears noting in this context since van Fraassen (1982, p. 32) takes a failure of autonomy to
entail a failure of the principle of the common cause in general. The availability of backwards causa-
tion models of quantum mechanics in the context of common cause theories of causation shows this
to be false—see for example Dowe (1997), clearly a coherent if in my view untenable interpretation.
See Sua´rez (2004) for further discussion.
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gether, the assumptions capture the intuitive EPR view according to which pre-
existing elements of reality determine measurement results; we are free to choose
what to measure; and our measurements do not have non-local or backwards-in-
time effects. The view is often referred to as local realism, and the violation of
the Bell-Wigner inequality by quantum mechanics shows that at least one of the
cluster of commitments that make it up must be discarded.
With the premises made explicit, it can be seen immediately which one is avail-
able for the purposes of our hypothetical EPR enthusiast—namely, correlations
between the measurements performed and her notebook records, amounting to a
failure of autonomy. The reason why this has been unattractive as a premise to
give up for the purpose of making sense of the EPR experiments is that if we are
considering a set of hidden variables as a potential common cause prior to mea-
surement, to give up autonomy means either having the hidden variables dictate
the selection of which measurement to perform, in violation of free will (and con-
spiratorially thwarting randomised experimental arrangements), or alternately hav-
ing the selection of measurements determine prior values of hidden variables by
backward causation—options which have been largely ignored by interpreters of
quantum mechanics18. But if we consider a future screening off event, such as a
record noting the type of measurement and the outcome, we can unproblematically
appeal to the second of these options, since like any other recording device, what
we have is a quite mundane case of forward causation.
The defence of the principle of the common cause at this point turns on finding
some past screening off event to close the fork, and I will make some brief com-
ments on two options for doing so. One option is to take the EPR enthusiast to
demonstrate the existence of a past common cause, and Bell’s Theorem to show
that such a past common cause must entail a violation of locality or autonomy—
and therefore seek to develop a model consistent with these constraints. The upshot
of the EPR enthusiast, however, is that such a model cannot simply consist in find-
ing an event that bears to the measurement outcomes the probabilistic relationships
definitive of a common cause—in our recording device, we already have such an
event, so we must be looking for something more than just this correlational struc-
ture. For example, it is not sufficient for the development of a backwards causation
model of the EPR correlations to merely identify some past event which is corre-
lated both with the measurement settings and measurement outcomes—some addi-
tional property of this event must serve to differentiate it from the recording device.
The suggestion by Dowe (1997) that a backwards causation model consistent with
the principle of the common cause demands hidden variables set by forks open to
the past (that is, not just by correlation with measurement settings) is one way this
18The most plausible development of the former option appeals to variable detector efficiency,
first proposed by by Pearle (1970) and most fully developed in the so-called prism models of Fine
(1982b,a). The latter option dates back to O. Costa de Beauregard and has been physically most
highly developed by Cramer (1997), and philosophically most developed by Huw Price—see Price
(1984, 1994, 1995, 1996b); Price (1994) is criticised by Dowe (1996), with a reply by Price (1996a).
See also Dowe (1997).
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can be achieved.
A second option is defended by Hausman and Woodward (1999, pp. 565-567).
They propose that the two EPR measurements are not distinct events, on the basis
that there is no means of independently manipulating the individual measurement
results. They accept that this is controversial, but here rather than challenging this
step of their argument I will concentrate on the implications. While it is a possibil-
ity that the measurements at some level form a single event, clearly the measure-
ment outcomes as recorded macroscopically—computer readouts, dials moving,
and so on—are all paradigmatically distinct events. Since these latter events are
correlated, the common cause principle demands a screening off event; and as be-
fore, our EPR enthusiast can happily provide one. Since, as before, this is clearly
not a case of backwards causation, what this entails is that Hausman and Woodward
are committed to the measurement event being the common cause of the measure-
ment records. While they claim that their model avoids “causal pathologies” (p.
267), it is unclear that a spatially distributed event of this sort playing the role of an
instantaneous common cause (instantaneous since the earliest distinct events will
be spacelike separated) does any better—in fact, it seems that this really amounts
to a kind of violation of locality.
The central point to make, regardless of the merits of any of these options, is
that it is not an option for those who subscribe to the principle of the common
cause to rule out the EPR cases as not falling under the principle, or not being the
kind of correlations that call for a causal explanation. To the extent it is attractive
to think of quantum mechanics as not permitting causal explanation of any sort at
all, this is not a position that can consistently be held together with the principle of
the common cause. Whether this is a reason to give up the principle, or rather to
seek the proper causal explanation, I leave to the commitments of the reader.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The principle of the common cause needs to be placed in the world both horizon-
tally, via extrinsic networks of probabilistic relations; and vertically, by locating
at what scale the variables satisfying the principle are to be found. Moreover, it
demands that a causal explanation be given for the EPR cases in quantum mechan-
ics. I have shown that these are tough demands to meet, by identifying a tension
threatening the possibility of vertical placement, and giving an EPR counterexam-
ple which showed that ignoring these cases is not an option.
While I did not raise problems with horizontal placement in this paper, it bears
noting in conclusion that there are other lessons to be drawn here. One of the ini-
tial attractions of the principle of the common cause is that it promises to provide
something like a local reduction of the direction of causation. As it turns out, those
wishing for a probabilistic reduction of causation via the principle end up requir-
ing a wealth of extrinsic relations, so that the causal asymmetry between any two
variables turns out to depend on their relationship to many more variables. The
upshot is that those seeking such an objective reduction for the asymmetry of cau-
18
sation should not be hostile to rival views which also propose extrinsic accounts.
In particular, they should not be over-hostile to agency views of causal asymmetry,
which can in this light be seen simply as a different form of extrinsic account of
the direction of causation.
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